ST. MARY’S BASILICA (231 N. 3rd Street) | TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 2011 AT 5: 30 P.M.
THE MOST REVEREND SALVATORE JOSEPH CORDILEONE,
Bishop of the Diocese of Oakland, California, will be the homilist.
Reception to follow in the Diocesan Center.
Inquiries: Maria Salapska, email@example.com a
DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
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weapon due to a prior felony conviction for
which his civil right to bear arms was not
restored, when the record establishes that sufficient or substantial independent or legally
obtained evidence was admitted at trial to sustain
the conviction, the required prejudice prong for
a fundamental error finding is not established,
and the defendant’s conviction and related sentence will be affirmed on appeal. State v. Kinney,
2 CA-CR 2010-0004, 10/28/10.
Rule 15. 8, ARIZ.R.CRIM.P., which allows
preclusion of any evidence not disclosed by
the State prior to a formal or express deadline
to accept a proffered plea agreement, also
applies to cases in which a plea offer is not
accompanied by an expressly stated deadline,
yet is subsequently withdrawn after assignment to a different prosecutor. Rule 15. 8 provides, “If the prosecution has imposed a plea
deadline in a case” “filed in Superior Court, but
does not provide the defense with material disclosure listed in Rule 15. 1 (b) at least 30 days
prior to the plea deadline, the court, upon
motion of the defendant” shall preclude later disclosed evidence if it finds the prosecutor’s failure
to provide such disclosure materially impacted
the defendant’s decision to reject the plea offer.
Although a “deadline” is a necessary element of
Rule 15. 8, the withdrawal of a plea offer by the
State in a particular case constitutes a deadline
that triggers the applicability of Rule 15. 8.
Longoria v. Hon. Slayton/State, 1 CA-SA 10-
A trial court errs in applying a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when following a mistrial the state pursues an indictment adding an additional charge where
undisputed facts fail to show a prima facie
case of vindictive prosecution. The U.S.
Constitution’s due process guarantees prevent
prosecutors from punishing defendants for exercising their protected legal rights at trial and on
appeal by subsequently subjecting them to more
severe charges, and a valid claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness limits a prosecutor’s otherwise
broad discretion over charging decisions.
Prosecutorial vindictiveness may be shown in two
ways. First, a defendant may show actual vindictiveness by proving through objective evidence
that a prosecutor acted in order to punish him
for standing on his legal rights. Second, as charging “motives [in a particular case may be] complex and difficult to prove,” a defendant may rely
on a presumption of vindictiveness if the totality
of the circumstances in a particular case establish
a “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” Such a
presumption is not applicable in a case where
mistrial occurs, and the state subsequently
adds a charge (that it could have included in
the original indictment, yet chose not to) to
strengthen a particular case and its ability to
present the full circumstances surrounding a
defendant’s arrest in which the trial court had
precluded evidence on the first day of trial