A Single Test Governs
Whether a Court May Exercise
Personal Jurisdiction Over an
Out-of-State Defendant,
Regardless of Whether the
Plaintiff Has Asserted Tort
Claims, Contract Claims, or
Both. Although the Ninth Circuit
uses two tests to determine personal jurisdiction (depending on
whether the suit sounds primarily
in contract or in tort is rejected),
the proper inquiry under Arizona
law is whether, considering all of
the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the
defendant engaged in purposeful
conduct for which it could reasonably expect to be hailed into state
court with respect to that conduct.
If the totality of a defendant’s contacts with the forum are sufficient,
the plaintiff may bring suit in the
forum based on those contacts,
regardless of the theory of recovery. The Planning Group of
Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews
Mineral Properties, Ltd., CV-10-
0189-PR, 1/21/11.
A.R.S. § 20-259.01 Does Not
Require Insurers to Provide
an Insured Who Speaks
Spanish with a Spanish-
Language Form Offering
Uninsured/Underinsured
Motorist Coverage. A.R.S. § 20-
259.01(A) provides that “[e]very
insurer writing automobile liability
or motor vehicle liability policies
shall make available to the named
insured thereunder and by written
notice offer the insured and at the
request of the insured shall include
within the policy uninsured
motorist coverage.” Section (B)
imposes the same requirements for
underinsured motorist coverage,
and both provisions provide that
“[t]he selection of limits or rejec-
tion of coverage by a named
insured or applicant on a form
approved by the director is valid for
all insureds under the policy.” The
“written notice” provision of § 20-
259.01 does not require transla-
tion of the offer into Spanish so
that a Spanish speaker understands
the offer’s terms. Ballestros v.
American Standard Insurance
Company of Wisconsin, CV-10-
0026-PR, 1/20/11.
Right to Recover for Injuries
Sustained Before Age 18 Belong
to the Parent and the Injured
Child, Though Double
Recovery Is Barred. Under the
common-law rule expressed in
Pearson & Dickerson Contractors,
Inc. v. Harrington, 60 Ariz. 354,
137 P.2d 381 (1943) and S. A.
Gerrard Co. v. Couch, 43 Ariz. 57,
29 P.2d 151 (1934), the right to
recover for the injuries sustained as
a minor belonged to the child’s
parents, though injured children
may recover other damages such as
pain and suffering and post-major-ity medical expenses. The rule
announced in those cases is outmoded. The right to bring suit for
childhood injuries belongs equally
to the child and the parents. To the
extent Pearson and Gerrard
conflict with the new rule, they are
overruled. Estate of DeSela v.
Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., CV-10-
0172-PR, 1/18/11.
SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL MATTERS
The Arizona Legislature did
not violate the separation of powers doctrine in 2009 by enacting
Senate Bill (SB) 1449, which
made retroactive SB 1145, a 2006
law that amended A.R.S. § 13-
205 (the self-defense or justification defense statute) by shifting the
burden of proof in cases in which a
defendant provides some evidence of
self defense or justification to the
State, requiring it to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act with justification. State v.
Montes, CR-10-0017-PR, 1/26/11.
A court may terminate probation in a case despite a defendant’s failure to complete all
required community service and
pay all outstanding fees and fines
under limited circumstances in
which it finds that, notwithstanding the defendant’s failure
to complete all terms of probation successfully, he has nonetheless rehabilitated himself and no
good purpose will be served by
further probation. State v. Lewis,
CR-10-0211-PR, 1/13/11.
SUPREME COURT JUVENILE MATTERS
COURT OF APPEALS CIVIL MATTERS
Detailed summaries of selected cases and other court news may be found at www.azapp.com.
sion (such as lacking the adverse
interests) is both unenforceable and
contrary to a policy’s cooperation
clause. Leflet v. Redwood Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 1 CA-CV 09-0663,
1/20/11.
Multiple Dominant Estate
Holders Sharing Use of a
Common Easement Must
Equitably Contribute to the Costs
Necessary to Maintain and Repair
the Easement. Even without a cost-sharing agreement or requirement in
the terms of the easement, the holders of a shared easement are entitled
to equitable contribution from one
another for repair and maintenance
of the easement. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 4. 13 (
recognizing duty of contribution unless
the terms of the easement provide
otherwise). The parties are not necessarily required to share the costs
equally. A court should equitably
apportion expenses after considering
all relevant factors. Freeman v.
Sorchych, 1 CA-CV 09-07240,
1/13/11.
A.R.S. § 48-3613(D) Requires
Courts to Issue an Order to
Remove an Obstruction and
Restore a Watercourse to its
Original State if Compliance with
the Statute and Authorization
from the Board Cannot Be
Achieved. A.R.S. § 48-3613(A)
provides that a person shall not
engage in any development which
will divert, retard or obstruct the
flow of waters in any watercourse
without securing written authorization from the board of the district in
which the watercourse is located.
Subsection (D) provides that “[i]f a
person is found to be in violation of
this section, the court shall require
Thomas L. Hudson is a member at Osborn Maledon PA, where his practice focuses
on civil appeals and appellate consulting with trial lawyers. He can be reached at
thudson@omlaw.com, and is ably assisted with this column by Osborn Maledon PA’s
appellate group, which maintains azapp.com. AzAPP contributors include Sharad H.
Desai, Brandon A. Hale, Shane M. Ham, Mark P. Hummels, Kathleen Brody
O’Meara, Joseph N. Roth, Christina C. Rubalcava and Kristin L. Windtberg.
