The Arizona Supreme Court accepted review or jurisdiction of the following petitions on May 15, 2017*:
Dale Allen Wright v. Gates/State, CR-16-0435-PR, 1 CA-SA 16-0058 (Opinion) 240 Ariz. 525 (App. 2016)
1. Did the Legislature intend to classify solicitation as a DCAC [dangerous crimes against children] offense in the
2. Consistent with Mejak v. Granville, can DCAC penalties be imposed for a completed offense (solicitation) where
there is no actual child victim of the solicited offense (child molestation)?
3. Is the distinction between the language in A.R.S. § 13-1002(A) and Model Penal Code § 5.02( 1) defining the
offense of solicitation relevant to resolution of the issues of statutory interpretation raised by Wright’s petition?
Emma Spring v. Timothy R. Bradford, CV-17-0068-PR, 1 CA-CV 15-0505 (Opinion), 241 Ariz. 455, 388 P.3d 849
• In criminal cases, prejudice is presumed for violations of witness sequestration under Rule 615. The Court of Appeals ruled that prejudice is not
presumed in civil cases, and the innocent party must prove ‘actual prejudice,’ which usually is impossible (and was here) due to the nature of the
violation. Should prejudice be presumed for Rule 615 violations in all cases, especially where the violations were deliberate acts of counsel?
• The plain language of Rule 615(c) gives trial courts discretion to allow a witness to hear (or read) trial testimony of a prior witness, provided
that witness’s presence during the prior testimony is shown to be ‘essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense.’ Is that showing of essential presence actually required, or may the trial court allow an expert to disregard sequestration merely upon request of counsel?
Barrett Johnson v. Almida Land & Cattle Co., CV-16-0280-PR, 1 CA-CV 15-0416
• Ordered: Almida Land & Cattle Company LLC’s Petition for Review is continued.
State of Arizona v. Douglas Christian Wasbotten, CR-17-0025-PR, 1 CA-CR 15-0556
• Ordered: Petition for Review is continued.
Shuja Sayed Ahmad et ux v. State of Arizona, CV-16-0269-PR, 1 CA-CV 14-0664
• Ordered: Petition for Review is continued (Justice Gould did not participate in the determination of the matter).
The Arizona Supreme Court accepted review or jurisdiction of the following petitions on April 18, 2017*:
John Fitzgerald v. Myers/State Ex Rel. Brnovich, CR-16-0285-PR, 1 CA-SA 16-0154 (filed as a special action, but taken as a petition for review
and review granted)
Whether the Respondent Judge’s ruling denying Petitioner’s Motion [for Hearing] to Determine Competency to Proceed in State Post-Conviction Proceedings [and to Stay All Other Proceedings] Until Such Time as Competency May Be Regained violated Petitioner’s rights:
1. Under ARS Section 13-4041(b) to effectively and competently communicate with his appointed counsel in Rule 32 Petition For Post
Conviction cases[;] 2. Under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32. 5 to effectively and competently determine if the information in
the Petition For Post Conviction Relief is true and accurate.
Tiffany Taylor v. Thomas Pandola, CV-16-0240-PR, 1 CA-CV 15-0191 FC
Does the Arizona Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, A.R.S. §§ 25-1201 to 25-1342 (2004), and/or federal law, including the Federal
Aid to Needy Families with Children statute, 42 U.S.C. § 666, require a court to confirm the alleged arrearages in a Notice of Registration
if the non-registering party fails to timely object?
Maria Carmen Zubia v. David Shapiro et al., CV-16-0255-PR, 1 CA-CV 15-0404
Does the failure of a non-defaulting homeowner to obtain injunctive relief pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-811 bar an action for damages against the
beneficiary who knew the title holder’s name was forged on the Deed of Trust?
Samiuddin v. Hon. Nothwehr/State, CR-16-0422-PR, 1 CA-SA 16-0229
Petitioner filed a motion to modify his release conditions, which prohibited him from having contact with his non-victim children. Following a
hearing, the Court said it would permit supervised visits through a court-approved agency if arranged by the defense, and set another hearing
for further argument. At the second hearing, Petitioner reiterated legal reasons for removing the no-contact order. The Court denied full contact, and allowed only limited contact supervised through a court-approved agency. Petitioner has to pay the cost of the supervision.
1. Is Respondent’s order authorized by any provision of Arizona law, where the relevant statutes do not expressly authorize such an order, and
catch-all provisions only permit conditions aimed at assuring appearance at trial, a goal not served by the order?
2. Does Respondent’s order satisfy the strict scrutiny required of an impingement on Mr. Samiuddin’s fundamental right in the care, custody,
and control of his children where ( 1) there were no findings supporting the order; ( 2) to the extent the order may be authorized, it is only
because the provisions permitting it are ambiguous; and ( 3) there is a less restrictive alternative already available to the State, namely family
court proceedings initiated by [the Department of Child Safety (DCS], to serve any interest at which the order is aimed?
compiled by Judy Schaffert,
Chief Staff Attorney
Arizona Supreme Court
Unless otherwise noted, the issues are taken verbatim from either the petition for review or the certified question.
—continued on p. 64