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Bar No. 016442; File No. 16-0663
PDJ No. 2017-9002
By final judgement and order dated
May 24, 2017, the presiding disciplinary judge accepted an agreement for discipline by consent
by which Pam Crowder-Archibald,
Phoenix, was suspended for 90
days and ordered to pay restitution
in the amount of $1,367.41. Ms.
Crowder-Archibald also was assessed
the costs of the proceedings totaling $1,495.96.
Ms. Crowder-Archibald represented a client in a personal injury
case. She knew of a medical lien for
about $3,400 that she signed and
returned to the medical provider
on April 29, 2008. Ms. Crowder-Archibald settled the case, and the
liability insurer sent her a settlement
check in February 2009 for $5,365.
She deposited the check into her
operating account instead of her
trust account and subsequently disbursed $1,000 to the client. Ms.
Crowder-Archibald retained the re-
mainder of the funds and did not
pay the outstanding known medical
lien. In 2010, the client learned that
Ms. Crowder-Archibald had failed
to pay the lien and tried to contact
Ms. Crowder-Archibald in 2010
and 2011. In September 2011, Ms.
Crowder-Archibald paid the lien-
holder $800. During the ensuing
years the lienholder sent Ms.
Crowder-Archibald multiple letters
and emails, and left her many voice-
mails, but she failed to make any
subsequent payment on the lien
until 2016. Ms. Crowder-Archibald
also failed to cooperate in the State
Bar’s investigation. She refused to
provide the State Bar information
regarding her operating account.
Aggravating factors: Prior disciplinary offenses, selfish or dishonest
motive, bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary process by intentionally
failing to comply with rules or orders
of the disciplinary agency, and substantial experience in the practice of
Mitigating factor: delay in the
Ms. Crowder-Archibald violated
Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT., ERs 1. 3,
1. 4, 1. 15(a), and 8. 1(b); and Rules
43(a) and 54(d), ARIZ.R.S.CT.
KIRK A. GUINN
Bar No. 015448; File Nos. 16-0776, 16-
PDJ No. 2017-9004
By judgment and order dated May
26, 2017 the presiding disciplinary
judge accepted an agreement for
discipline by consent by which Kirk
A. Guinn, Mesa, Ariz., was suspended for 18 months effective 30
days from the date of the order. He
also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding in the amount of $1,225.40.
In Count One of the two-count
consent agreement, Mr. Guinn represented a client in a personal bankruptcy matter. Mr. Guinn and his
daughter appeared at the client’s
home and personally drove away the
client’s vehicles prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition for the client.
Thereafter, the lender on the vehicles received notification from a
company called Sperro Towing in
Indiana, threatening that if it failed
to pay towing and storage costs of
$5,232.85, the vehicles would be
sold at auction. When the lender
made arrangements to pay the
amount, it was told that the vehicles
had already been sold. Thereafter,
in the client’s bankruptcy matter,
the U.S. Trustee moved for denial
of prior fees and request for dis-
gorgement after learning that Mr.
Guinn had been paid his attorneys’
fees by a company named Fenner
and Associates that had been affili-
ated with Sperro Towing. The fees
were paid in exchange for Mr.
Guinn facilitating the transfer of the
vehicles to Fenner. The Bankruptcy
Court ordered Mr. Guinn to dis-
gorge all fees collected through his
involvement with Fenner. Mr. Guinn
complied with the order.
In Count Two, Mr. Guinn represented a personal bankruptcy client whose fees also were paid by
Fenner. Mr. Guinn facilitated the
transfer of the client’s vehicle to
Indiana. When the client attempted
to contact Mr. Guinn regarding delays in his bankruptcy, Mr. Guinn
failed to return phone calls. The client’s vehicle was eventually returned
to the client’s lender.