SUPREME COURT CIVIL MATTERS
Arizona’s Uniform Trade
Secrets Act does not displace
common-law claims based on
alleged misappropriation of confidential information that is not a
trade secret. The Arizona Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (“AUTSA”)
“displaces conflicting tort, restitu-tionary and other laws of this state
providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” A.R.S.
§ 44-407( A). The AUTSA does not
preempt a claim based on the misuse
of confidential information that
does not rise to the level of [a] trade
secret. Rather, AUTSA, on its face
leaves undisturbed claims that are
not based on a misappropriation of
a trade secret. Orca Communications
Unlimited, LLC v. Noder, CV-13-
0351-PR, 11/19/14.
Candidate for election who
fails to comply with statutory
requirements for inclusion on
ballot for one position may not
be included on ballot for another
position. A.R.S. § 16-314(D) requires
the nomination petition of a candidate for an unexpired term to designate the expiration date of the term.
Although this requirement does not
apply to candidates for the full term,
a candidate who seeks an unexpired
term cannot ask the superior court
to be included on the ballot for
another provision. Malnar v. Joice,
CV-14-0240-AP/EL, 11/14/14.
Arizona’s constitutional prohibition on “special laws” favoring
one person or group requires that
laws applying to a class must be
“elastic,” meaning that members
can move in and out of the
class, but does not require it be
APPELLATE HIGHLIGHTS
by Thomas L. Hudson, Eric M. Fraser and Joseph N. Roth (civil), Patrick C. Coppen (criminal), and James M. Susa (tax). Family Law
summaries are prepared by the Case Law Update Committee of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Arizona.
Thomas L. Hudson, Eric M. Fraser and Joseph N. Roth are attorneys at Osborn
Maledon PA, where their practices focuses on civil appeals and appellate consulting
with trial lawyers. They may be reached at thudson@omlaw.com, efraser@omlaw.com
and jroth@omlaw.com, and are ably assisted with this column by Osborn Maledon PA’s
appellate group, which maintains azapp.com. AzAPP contributors include
Yaser Ali, Nathan T. Arrowsmith, Sharad H. Desai, Joshua Ernst, Chelsea
Sage Gaberdiel, Brandon A. Hale, Shane M. Ham, Grace E. Rebling and
James K. Rogers.
Patrick C. Coppen is a sole practitioner in Tucson.
James M. Susa is a shareholder in the Tucson office of DeConcini McDonald Yetwin
& Lacy PC.
“reasonably probable” that class
membership will change within
a “particular time.” Arizona’s
Constitution prohibits “special
laws” regarding the “conduct of
elections.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2,
§ 19( 11). To pass muster under
this prohibition, laws applying to a
class must be “elastic,” meaning
that members of the class must be
able to move in and out of the class.
In 2010, the Legislature amended
the statute governing election of
members of Arizona’s community
college boards, but made the
amendment applicable only to
counties with populations of more
than three million. Although only
Maricopa County had that large a
population, the law was “elastic”
because Maricopa County could
drop below 3 million people and
other counties could grow to more
than 3 million. The fact that it may
have not been “reasonably probable” that other counties would
come into the regulated class within
some “particular time” was not
relevant to the special-laws analysis.
Gallardo v. Arizona, CV-14-0208-
PR/A, 10/30/14.
COURT OF APPEALS CIVIL MATTERS
Written documents setting
forth requirements of one party
coupled with that party’s conduct
carrying out the requirements
may create an “executed” written
agreement. When ( 1) an insurer of
a subcontractor promises to cover
as an additional insured any entity
that is an “additional insured” under
an “executed” “written contract or
written agreement,”( 2) a home
developer hires a subcontractor and
requires in writing that the subcon-
tractor name the developer as an
additional insured, and ( 3) the
subcontractor directs its insurance
broker to issue certificates of insur-
ance naming the developer, a fact-
finder could conclude that there was
an “executed” written agreement to
name the developer as an additional
insured even though there is not
a specific document signed by the
parties. KB Home Tucson, Inc. v.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 1 CA-
CV 12-0681, 11/25/14.
The inclusion of Rule 54(c)
language in a judgment that does
not resolve all claims by all
parties is not a final, appealable
judgment. In general, the Court
of Appeals only has jurisdiction
over final judgments. Under
ARIZ.R.CIV.P. 54(c), a judgment is
not final unless the superior court
“states that no further matters
remain pending and that the judgment is entered pursuant to Rule
54(c).” If the superior court mistakenly includes those magic words in
a judgment when in fact not all
claims or parties have been resolved,
then the judgment is not final and
the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over an appeal from
that judgment. Mill Alley Partners v.
Wallace, 1 CA-CV 13-0547,
11/20/14.
No private right of action
exists to enforce statutory rules
on disposal of surplus monies
held by political committees.
A.R.S. § 16-915.01 places limitations on how a political committee
may dispose of surplus monies. That
statute, however, does not create a
private right of action. Therefore,
a private lawsuit alleging improper
transfer or disposal of funds of a
political action committee under
that statute should be dismissed.
McNamara v. Citizens Protecting
Tax Payers, 1 CA-CV 13-0551,
10/30/14.
A homeowner who rents out a
room to a pet owner is not liable
as the “owner” of the renter’s
dog unless the homeowner exer-
cised care, custody or control over
the dog. Under A.R.S. § 11-
1001( 10), “any person keeping” a
dog in their home “for more than
six consecutive days” is considered
the “owner” of the dog and is
strictly liable for harm the dog
causes. A homeowner who is merely
“housing” or “harboring” a renter’s
dog is not “keeping” the dog under the
statute. To show a person is “keeping”
the animal, there must be evidence
that the person exercised care, custody
or control over the dog. Spirlong
v. Browne, 1 CA-CV 12-0763,
10/28/14.
Deed of trust provided constructive notice even though it contained
an incorrect legal description because
it nonetheless correctly identified
property by its street address and
correctly listed trustors’ names.
Arizona has rejected a theory of strict
statutory construction that would hold
any defect in a deed of trust as fatal to
providing constructive notice. A deed of
trust that contains an incorrect legal
description, but otherwise correctly
identifies the property by its street
address and by the trustors’ names, is
valid and sufficient to give constructive
notice. Manicom v. Citimortgage, Inc.,
2 CA-CV 2014-0049, 10/28/14.
COURT OF APPEALS CRIMINAL MATTERS
The act of removing property
from the open bed of a pickup truck
constitutes “entry” of a structure
under Arizona burglary statutes. The
term “entry” under A.R.S. § 13-
1501( 3) means “the intrusion of … any
part of a person’s body inside the
external boundaries of a structure.”
Furthermore, pursuant to § 13-
1501( 12), a “structure” can include
“any building, object, vehicle, railroad
car or place with sides and a floor that
is separately securable from any other
structure attached to it and that is used
for lodging, business, transportation,
recreation or storage”, while under §
13-105( 41) a “vehicle” is a device in,
upon or by which any person or property is … transported or drawn upon a
highway.” The act of reaching into
a truck bed amounts to an intrusion
beyond the external boundaries of the
structure because the sides of a truck
bed provide the external boundary for
that part of the vehicle. State v. Bon, 2
CA-CR 2014-0054, 11/28/14.
A trial court does not abuse its
discretion in admitting an ADOC
“pen Pack” as a self-authenticating,
certified copy of a public record pursuant to Rule 902( 8), ARIZ.R.EVID.,
to prove a defendant had historical
prior felony convictions for sentence
enhancement purposes where the pen
